A Common Property Resource is one on which a well-defined group or community have exclusive property rights with subtractibility condition where each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of others (Berkes et.al 1989; Jodha 1990; Pasha 1992). Many concepts are used in the literatures by researchers from different disciplines in different circumstances. The discussion of CPRs should preamble by a discussion of property right, which separates the issue from the standard resource related issues. According to Bromley (1991), common property is not an object but a social relation that defines the property holder with respect to something of value. “Property” has been defined as a bundle of rights which relate to use and transfer of resources.

Property rights regimes vary by the nature of ownership, rights and duties of owners, rules of use, and locus of control. Hana et al. (1995) presents a simple taxonomy of four types of property rights - private property, common property, state property and open access (McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Bromley 1989; Fenny and others 1990; Ostrom 1990). Property rights constitute institutions as they define the manner in which the right holders and others interact over the use of a resource. As Bromley (1989) conceptualized Common Property Resources as private property for a group, to phrase it another way Pasha (1992) recognized CPRs as those which are collectively used by a group of people. However, Jodha (1990) defined it alternately as “those (non-exclusive resources) in which a group of people have co-equal user rights”. Common property resources are the resources held by an identifiable community of independent users in which these users exclude outsiders while regulating use by members of the total community (Fenny et.al 1998).

In India the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO, 1999) defined CPR as resources accessible to and collectively owned\held\managed by an identifiable community on which no individual has exclusive property rights. The report also explained the terms like “accessible”, “collectively owned\held\managed”, “identifiable community” and “exclusive property rights”. The resources falling in this category are village panchayat grazing land/pasture land, village forest and woodlot (not under Forest/Revenue Department), van panchayat, village sites, threshing floor, community forests, village community pond, rivers, rivulets as well as their banks and beds. The collections from CPRs are community assets that provide both tangible and intangible livelihood to their dependents (Shyhendra, 2002). The rural poor are considerably dependent on CPRs for their livelihood, income, asset and consumption.

Characteristics of CPR:

Common property resources are for common use of the villagers or communities. Exclusion and indivisibility are the two characteristics distinguish the commons from the other resources (Oakerson 1986, Kadekodi 2004). CPRs are subject to individual use but not to individual possession, the users have independent rights of use and users constitute a collectivity and together have the right to exclude the outsiders (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, Kadekodi 2004, NSSO 1999). CPR is subtractible, where each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of others (Berkes et.al Kadekodi 2004). Stevenson (1991) noted seven different characteristic of CPRs, such as necessary and sufficient for successful management, where the resource units bound to be well defined by physical, biological and social parameters, existence of well-defined user group, acceptability of multiple extraction by the defined users, existence of implicit rules among the users on resource extraction, users’ joint and exclusive entitlement to the resource, generation of negative externality among the users due to competition in resource extraction and existence of well-defined right holders, which may or may not coincide with user group (Bromley and Cernea 1989).

Dimension of CPR Studies:

Researchers have tried to capture the dimensions, in terms of their evolution and status of rights, nature of use, management of the institutions, decline of the resource over time, contribution on rural development and sustainability of the resources. Most of the studies have tried to look into the respective issues mentioned in the particular dimension with deep insights.

Common Property Resources and Open Access Resources:

Evolution of the common property resources has been an area of concern for a prolonged period of time, where the non-existence of the clear property right is the area of research. Property rights regimes differ by the nature of ownership, the rights and duties of owners, the rules of use, and the locus of control. Initially the property right existence and complete non-existence was an area of confusion. But the gross diversion in resource use, in case of the two types of institutional set ups, compelled the researchers to work in this aera.

Importantly, the distinction between open access and common property was clarified by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) and subsequently adopted and developed by several other scholars (Bromley 1986, 1989; Runge 1986; Oakerson 1986; Berkeseta/. 1989; Bromley and Cemea 1989; Ostrom 1990). Ciriacy-Wantrupand Bishop (1975) differentiated Common property from open access by stating that common property is not "everybody’s property", implying that potential resource users who are not members of a group of co-equal owners are excluded. However Bromley and Cerena (1989) précised that in a situation of open access each potential user has complete autonomy to use the resource since no-one has the legal ability to keep any potential user out and in case of common property a certain group or community has exclusive usufructs along with the right to exclude the outsiders. The abstraction of variation between the two has been portrayed clearly by Swallow in 1990 through certain characteristics such as: no individual has exclusive rights to the use of the resource; (2) group members have secure expectations about accruing gain from future use of the resource (3) functioning membership criteria; (4) communally-defined guidelines for resource use; and (5) enforcement mechanism for punishing deviant behaviour. Bromley (1991) argues that property is not an object but is rather asocial relation that defines the property holder with respect to value and right on a resource conveys the meaning that the property right holder is independent to use exchange or sell the resource. Property rights regimes have two components: property rights, bundles of entitlements defining owners’ rights and duties in the use of a particular resource, and property rules, the rules under which those rights and duties are exercised (Bromley 1991).

Decline in CPRs:

The paradigm of CPR noticed the decline in CPR areas in over time. The depletion of the commons was well documented for the first time in 1968 by Garrett Hardin by coming the term ‘The tragedy of the commons’, where he opined that runaway population growth belongs to a set of problems for which technical solution do not exist, and put emphasis on the metaphor of common property resource management. Jodha (1986) explains the three forms of decline. They are-

1) Physical loss of resources due to newly designed infrastructure.

2) Deterioration of physical productivity of resources.

3) Relocation of property rights and transform in its use (Jodha ,1986)

On the basis of intensive details from two villages in Rajasthan, Jodha (1985) has revealed the decline in the number of watering points from 36 to 17, along with the decline of catchment area from 769 to 456 ha, from 1953-54 to 1972-73. In 21 districts in dry regions over seven states Jodha (1986) found that during his study in 1982-84 the extent of CPRs in his study villages was ranged from 9-28 percent which is a sharp decline from 15-42 percent in 1950-52. Pasha (1992) perceived that the degradation in Karnataka was 35.6 percent to 23.7 percent. Jodha (1985) identified that the main reasons of depletion are- privatization, growth of population and the different developmental programmes (Pasha 1992). Beck 1994, observed that in West Bengal the main reason of depletion is increasing the dependency of poor people on CPRs which is due to the increasing agricultural development and commoditization of formerly open access natural resources. Gowda and Sadavatti (2004) analyzed that in case of forest (North Karnataka) the CPR-based activities of rural households itself was a reason of depletion.

This exhaustion of CPRs may also badly affect the resilience of the entire ecological system (Dasgupta and Maeler1997). Hence the depletion of the CPR deteriorates the condition of the significant resource users. In such a situation, informal CPRs regimes, based on traditional ecological knowledge may evolve to control the exploitation of resources (Berkes, 1989) which may well to protect the CPRs and support the users or it may be dysfunctional (Amott & Stighitz, 1991). The functioning of CPR significantly depends upon its management.

Common Property Resource Management:

The repercussion of over exploitation and poor management of CPRs leads to in serious environmental degradation and associated problems of climate change, deterioration in livelihood support system and unsustainable economic growth. The developing countries which heavily depend on natural resources are the most vulnerable to the damages caused by declining natural resource base. Many researchers have chronicled the functioning of CPR management system in different culture by means of comprehensive and complex rules adapted in the local context (Wade 1987; Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Bardhan 2000). The perquisite of sustainable development is to establish and strengthen the institutional arrangements, and, ensure the stream of benefits. The important driving force behind the active participation in maintaining the CPR is dependency of poor people on CPRs (Balasubramanian 2004). Group size in successful CPR management has also been considered as an important factor where Olson (1971) showed that smaller the group, the more likely the voluntary collective action.

Research on common property has been repeatedly concentrated on the operational rules and regulations, mechanism and institutions which rural communities acquired for CPR management. The review of CPR management in different arrangement indicates the relative effectiveness of community managed resources with success and failure stories, involving cooperation and conflict. Oakerson’s (1986) model shows that technical and physical attributes, decision making arrangements, patterns of interaction and outcomes are the important components of CPR management. Analysing Oakerson framework, Easter and Palansami (1986) concluded that in case of tank irrigation system physical and technological factors influence the CPR management system, where operating rules were involved in collective use of these tanks. The author witnessed conflicts between encroachments and farmers, leading to inefficient tank water distribution and low crop yields. However equity in tank management was found where farmers with approximately equal farm size cooperate in the distribution of water supplies.

According to Wade (1987), emergence of corporate institutions with collective action can characteristics of the resources, the user group, complementary and compatible relationship between users and resources, the state relations, the technology for its exploitation, the property-rights regime and the largest set of institutional arrangements (Wade 1987; Berks 1989). One of the most important types of rules is boundary rules determining who has rights and responsibilities and what territory are covered by a particular group and membership in a group (Ostrom 1990). Chopra et al. (1989) performed a successful experiment of management system where they found conflicts among users due to unequal distribution of irrigation water due to lack of rules and regulations. Study revealed that conflict was resolved by establishing water users’ society and changing the water distribution system from conveyance system to equal distribution to every user. White and Runge (1994) found that maximum participation in voluntary collective action is highly depended on individual’s experience of the externality and the high potentiality of gaining from cooperation in CPR management. Sengupta (1995) investigated questions on the viability and endemic of common property institution and markets theories. He also investigated the existence of institution and their basic characteristics. Bardhan (2000) analysed the determinants of cooperation using three alternative variables- quality maintenance of distributaries and field channels, absence of conflict in water allocation, extent of violation in water allocation. According to Sundor (2001) and Duncan (2007) Conflicts are inevitable in community institutions due to the nature of restrictions exists for community resource management.

Sethi and Somanathan (2006) suggest that in case of violation of rules, there must be some provision of punishment which will work when the prospect of being punished is high enough to act as a deterrent, the cost of imposing the punishment is low, and the cost of creating (and sustaining) cooperation are lower than the benefits of collective action. Torri (2009) in his Thanagazi region case study showed that how local institutions like gram sabha inflict instance of successful community based conservation. Bon (2000) through two field studies in Himachal Pradesh examined that there were internal caste conflicts between the Rajput and poor farmer’s in management of community forest, grazing lands and gravity flow irrigation systems.

Contribution of CPRs in Rural Development:

In rural areas CPRs have impacted the livelihoods of the rural poor by providing alternative assets in agriculture and operating as a safety net for sustenance of the poor are alternative means of asserting the need to protect such resources (Jodha 1990). The poor households have been found to obtain greater income benefits from CPRs than non-poor households (Jodha 1986, 1990; Pasha 1992, Beck 1994). Jodha (1995) estimated that the average annual income per poor household extended between Rs. 530 to Rs. 830 and that was higher than the income generated by a number of anti-poverty programmes in some areas, while the non-poor derived only Rs 300.He also illustrated that between 84 and 100 percent of the poor households collected fuel, fodder and food items from CPRs while 10 to 28 percent rich household collect the same. Dasgupta (2006) found that the poorer households used to receive 20 to 40 percent of their incomes from CPRs based activity. Pasha (1992) investigated in his study that 10 percent of the gross income of poor was depend on CPRs while in non-poor it was 6.2 percent. Gowda and Savadatti (2004) observed that around 25 percent of poor households depended to a greater extent on CPRs while in case of non-poor it was 22 percent. Bhattacharya (2002) also estimated the dependence of income from forest in Bele Math, West Bengal and it was a common finding that the dependency on CPRs was high poor households and dropped off with income. From a concise but careful study of the existing literature on CPR, it has been well observed that empirical studies, mostly conducted by researchers were yet to be completed without any strong platform, which can only be provided by the economic study. The gap was fulfilled by the work of Partha Dasgupta through his notable contribution titled “Common Property Resources: Economic Analytics”, which was a set of lectures he delivered in SANDEE workshop in 2005. The paper enlightens the theory that identified the circumstances in which the communitarian institutions can function well. This paper also points the situation when such institution can disentangle itself. The theory also portrays the situation, where in long term relationship, one group has the permission to exploit the other (Dasgupta 2005).

Thus, CPRs form integral component of the rural environmental base and they are of special importance to the rural people. But the sustenance of these resources significantly depends upon the usability, maintenance and management of the resources. It has been evident from various studies that overtime the CPRs have been over exploited and suffered significant degradation (Jodha 1986, 1990, 1995; Pasha 1992; Iyangar 1989; Gowda and Savadatti 2004)

The Way Ahead:

The present review has captured the works, most of which are case studies, conducted, in different parts of India, and, in some cases, abroad. It is obvious that economists would like to see the behavioural aspects, at individual level and also at the group level, for either the success or the failure of the CPRs. Similarly, the political scientists are interested about the role of state in managing CPRs. Unequivocally, the overall decline of the resource provides a clear trend that uses of CPR are unsustainable. But it is also true that CPRs are decentralised by their definition and characters, hence a general theory of CPR may not be able to capture the functioning in its entirety. Rather the group behaviour to manage and maintain a CPR gained importance historically. However in the present context, the seriousness points to the identification of the set of factors, jointly responsible for smooth and successful functioning of the resource and to make it sustainable. Last but not the least, common property resources need prolonged study in the context of fast approaching climate change and population displacement.

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Received on 20.09.2018 Modified on 09.10.2018

Res. J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 2019; 10(1): 253-258.

DOI: 10.5958/2321-5828.2019.00046.9

Regime Type	Owner	Owner Rights	Owner duties
Private property	Individual	Socially acceptable uses; control of access	Avoidance of socially unacceptable uses
Common property	Collective	Exclusion of non-owners	Maintenance; constraints of use
State property	Citizens	Determine rules	Maintain social objectives
Open access	None	Capture	None